The organized crime is a relevant ethical, cultural, legal, sociologic and economic issue in many countries. In the last years there have been some positive signs of a reaction against the mafia like the successful experience of Addiopizzo, an anti-bribery association founded in Palermo in 2004 that today counts over 500 affiliated firms. Gambetta [1993] suggests the mafia could better be understood as a profit maximizing corporation in the marketplace for private protection. Despite this position has been criticized [Scalia 2010], it highlights the crucial role of the pizzo1 for the mafia activities. In this study, we identify as «Anti-mafia Entrepreneurial Behaviour» (Aeb) the choice of the firm of not paying the pizzo and making this commitment public and visible. It can be motivated by the following main reasons: confidence in the activities of institutions and anti-racket associations [Comitato Addiopizzo 2008; Vaccaro 2012]; economic unsustainability of the pizzo and refusal of management constraints (imposition of employees, of suppliers, etc.) [Anderson 1995; Skaperdas 2001]; a strong financial situation, able to with*stand any adverse effects subsequent; the civic consciousness and the rejection of the mafia culture with its rules; a cultural change, making this choice more spontaneous; the arrest of some members of mafia clans, making unavoidable the judicial collaboration to avoid a complaint; the interest in a positive image in the market by belonging to important anti-racket association; new institutional circumstances in which the firm operates (such as a more severe policy of category professional associations). This paper analyses the consequences of this entrepreneurial choice using a quantitative method. The underlying research question is: what is the impact of the Aeb on firm performance? To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first about these consequences. One of the main reasons to explain this gap in literature is probably the strong difficulty to measure a hidden phenomenon like the payment of pizzo by the firms [Gambetta 1993]. The paper mainly contributes to the corporate performance literature [Hansen and Wernelfelt 1989; Dyer 2006] by analysing an internal determinant (the Aeb) not yet investigated.
The effects of the anti-mafia entrepreneurial behavior on firm performance: an empirical study on southern Italian small-medium enterprises
LA ROSA, FABIO;
2015-01-01
Abstract
The organized crime is a relevant ethical, cultural, legal, sociologic and economic issue in many countries. In the last years there have been some positive signs of a reaction against the mafia like the successful experience of Addiopizzo, an anti-bribery association founded in Palermo in 2004 that today counts over 500 affiliated firms. Gambetta [1993] suggests the mafia could better be understood as a profit maximizing corporation in the marketplace for private protection. Despite this position has been criticized [Scalia 2010], it highlights the crucial role of the pizzo1 for the mafia activities. In this study, we identify as «Anti-mafia Entrepreneurial Behaviour» (Aeb) the choice of the firm of not paying the pizzo and making this commitment public and visible. It can be motivated by the following main reasons: confidence in the activities of institutions and anti-racket associations [Comitato Addiopizzo 2008; Vaccaro 2012]; economic unsustainability of the pizzo and refusal of management constraints (imposition of employees, of suppliers, etc.) [Anderson 1995; Skaperdas 2001]; a strong financial situation, able to with*stand any adverse effects subsequent; the civic consciousness and the rejection of the mafia culture with its rules; a cultural change, making this choice more spontaneous; the arrest of some members of mafia clans, making unavoidable the judicial collaboration to avoid a complaint; the interest in a positive image in the market by belonging to important anti-racket association; new institutional circumstances in which the firm operates (such as a more severe policy of category professional associations). This paper analyses the consequences of this entrepreneurial choice using a quantitative method. The underlying research question is: what is the impact of the Aeb on firm performance? To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first about these consequences. One of the main reasons to explain this gap in literature is probably the strong difficulty to measure a hidden phenomenon like the payment of pizzo by the firms [Gambetta 1993]. The paper mainly contributes to the corporate performance literature [Hansen and Wernelfelt 1989; Dyer 2006] by analysing an internal determinant (the Aeb) not yet investigated.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
