A relational approach to responsibility in organizations: The logic of gift and Lévinasian ethics for a ‘corporeal’ responsibility

The main purpose of this article is to classify some of the main theories on responsibility in organizations using a relational approach, according to the logic of gift. Since the logic of gift can be quite ambiguous and ambivalent, it will be necessary to clarify what this logic means from a philosophical point of view. In order to reach this purpose, a Le ́vinasian approach to responsibility will be used. After having clarified the concept of responsibility here adopted, the article will focus on relationships and their meaning. I argue that many of the theories on responsibility in organizations lack of the complexity and pluralism that the logic of gift can provide for the comprehension of relationships of responsibility. After having mapped the main theories on responsibilities in organizations using the logic of gift, the article will propose an evolutionary path to develop existing or new theories according to this approach.