The essay addresses the impact of vulnerability theory («Vt») on legal reasoning first by signalling the difficulty to reconcile the concept of vulnerability with the traditional legal dogmatics which is centred around the idea of personal responsibility and second by arguing that legal sentimentalism may best define an appropriate theory of legal reasoning for Vt. In the end, the limits of both legal sentimentalism and Vt will be pointed out.
Vulnerabilità, giudizio di costituzionalità e sentimentalismo
Lucia Corso
2018-01-01
Abstract
The essay addresses the impact of vulnerability theory («Vt») on legal reasoning first by signalling the difficulty to reconcile the concept of vulnerability with the traditional legal dogmatics which is centred around the idea of personal responsibility and second by arguing that legal sentimentalism may best define an appropriate theory of legal reasoning for Vt. In the end, the limits of both legal sentimentalism and Vt will be pointed out.File in questo prodotto:
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